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The central assumption in public finance is that agents optimize fully with respect 
to tax policies. But recently there is accumulating empirical evidence that suggests tax 
salience affects agents’ decision-making, which will departure from the full 
optimization. Based on the current definition of salience, I make it more general to suit 
various tax systems including China, which suggests that tax salience is the extent and 
accuracy of which agents include it to the tax-inclusive price.  
Current work mostly focuses on the impact of sales tax salience in America. 
Income tax is viewed as a highly salient tax. But I notice that even though income tax 
is recognized by most laborers, its exact amount is not visible and prominent for most 
self-employees. Based on the existing empirical evidence, and assuming that the impact 
of salience of labor income tax does exist, I use the canonical static labor supply model, 
the competitive equilibrium condition and bounded rationality model to demonstrate 
the effects of labor income tax salience and the reason why salience exists. Results 
show that: salience of labor income tax takes the form of under-estimating and over-
estimating income tax by taxpayers. When laborers under-estimate their income tax 
burden, they may over-supply labor and bear more incidence while the incidence on 
firms is less. On the contrary, when laborers over-estimate their income tax burden, they 
may under-supply labor, and the incidence is transferred from laborers to firms. With 
regard to the reasons of salience, cognitive costs account for why people have cognitive 
biases when evaluating tax burden. With the decrease of cognitive costs, the range of 
cognitive bias in which tax can remain low-salient decreases with a lower rate. This 
means, with the decline of cognitive costs, people still tend to remain not calculating 
the accurate tax burden in the specific range. In the end, I theoretically compose an 
ideal optimal tax salience used by policymakers. 
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和 David Laibson（2006）所提出的术语，有些商品税政策是“隐藏属性”[10]。 
税收显著性以及它对纳税人行为反应的作用可能被税收的征收形式影响。
Aradhna Krishna和 Joel Slemrod（2003）研究表明税收的结构会使得税收不那么
明显[11]。Chetty等（2009）[8]和 Finkelstein（2009）[9]的研究也都反映，同一种税
收以两种不同的形式征收，一种征收方式比另一种更显著。联邦、州和地方政府






























研究关注税率。C. V. Brown（1968）[14]，Edwin T. Fujii和 Clifford B. Hawley（1988）
[15]发现个体申报的边际税率往往不同于人口和收入特征所显示的边际税率。









有一些文献对所得税的平均税率和边际税率做了考察。Charles A.M. de 
Bartolome（1995）利用实验发现，许多MBA学生在做一美元投资的课税或不课
税项目时，将平均税率当作边际税率使用[18]。 Shaun Bowler 和 Donovan Todd






























有行为改变。正如 Laurence J. Kotlikoff和 David Rapson（2006）所发现的，所得













始价格。比如，Amos Tversky和 Daniel Kahneman（1986）发现价格的结构和呈
现方式会影响消费者的决策[24]。特别是当消费者估算税收时，他们会认为总价更
接近于不含税的标价而不是含税价。第二类是 Edward J. McCaffery 和 Jonathan 
Baron（2003）所说的“分解偏见”[25]，即纳税人无法结合不同税收体系的作用。
第三类是“乐观偏见”，它导致个体低估负面影响，比如导致消费者低估税负。
David A. Armor，Shelley E. Tayor等（2002）[26]研究了乐观偏见对个体预测的影
响。 
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